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Do Financial Incentives Alter Physician Prescription Behavior? Evidence from Random Patient-GP Allocations
Radni materijali EIZ-a, (2017), 1; 1-25. urn:nbn:hr:213:677696
Ahammer, Alexander; Zilic, Ivan

Institutional repository: The Institute of Economics, Zagreb

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Ahammer, A. & Zilic, I. (2017). Do Financial Incentives Alter Physician Prescription Behavior? Evidence from Random Patient-GP Allocations. Radni materijali EIZ-a, (1), 1-25. Retrieved from https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:213:677696

Ahammer, Alexander and Ivan Zilic. "Do Financial Incentives Alter Physician Prescription Behavior? Evidence from Random Patient-GP Allocations." Radni materijali EIZ-a, no. 1, 2017, pp. 1-25. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:213:677696

Ahammer, Alexander and Ivan Zilic. "Do Financial Incentives Alter Physician Prescription Behavior? Evidence from Random Patient-GP Allocations." Radni materijali EIZ-a no. 1 (2017): 1-25. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:213:677696

Ahammer, A. and Zilic, I. (2017) 'Do Financial Incentives Alter Physician Prescription Behavior? Evidence from Random Patient-GP Allocations', Radni materijali EIZ-a, (1), pp. 1-25. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:213:677696 (Accessed 20 November 2024)

Ahammer A, Zilic I. Do Financial Incentives Alter Physician Prescription Behavior? Evidence from Random Patient-GP Allocations. Radni materijali EIZ-a [Internet]. 2017 April 03 [cited 2024 November 20];(1):1-25. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:213:677696

A. Ahammer and I. Zilic, "Do Financial Incentives Alter Physician Prescription Behavior? Evidence from Random Patient-GP Allocations", Radni materijali EIZ-a, no. 1, pp. 1-25, April 2017. [Online]. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:213:677696. [Accessed: 20 November 2024]

Metadata
Title (croatian)Do Financial Incentives Alter Physician Prescription Behavior? Evidence from Random Patient-GP Allocations
Title (english)Do Financial Incentives Alter Physician Prescription Behavior? Evidence from Random Patient-GP Allocations
AuthorAlexander Ahammer
AuthorIvan Zilic
MBZ: 330260
Author's institutionThe Institute of Economics, Zagreb
(Department for Labor Markets and Social Policy)
Scientific / art field,
discipline and subdiscipline		SOCIAL SCIENCES
Economics
Abstract (croatian)
Reagiraju li liječnici na financijske poticaje? Odgovaramo na ovo pitanje analizom propisivanja lijekova liječnika kojima je dopušteno prodavati lijekove u sklopu ljekarne u ordinaciji. Koristeći administrativne podatke koji obuhvaćaju više od 16 milijuna medicinskih konzultacija između 2008. i 2012. godine u Gornjoj Austriji, obična usporedba pokazuje da postojanje ljekarne u ordinaciji rezultira 33,2% većim troškovima lijekova. U svrhu procjene kauzalnog efekta ljekarne u ordinaciji, koristimo identifikacijsku strategiju koja počiva na sljedećim temeljima: prvo, koristimo širok skup kovarijata u kombinaciji s multidimenzionalnim fiksnim učincima koji kontroliraju heterogenost pacijenata i liječnika, kao i sortiranje liječnika u ordinacije s ljekarnama. Drugo, koristimo novi pristup koji nam omogućuje da ograničimo uzorak na nasumično spojene parove pacijent-liječnik što isključuje endogeno sortiranje pacijenata kao principala i liječnika kao agenta. Za razliku od deskriptivne analize, nalazimo da ljekarne u ordinaciji zapravo imaju negativan utjecaj na troškove lijekova. Iako liječnici koji rade u ordinaciji s ljekarnom u prosjeku propisuju skuplje lijekove, ukupni učinak na troškove je negativan jer spomenuti liječnici imaju mnogo manju vjerojatnost propisivanja bilo kojeg lijeka.
Abstract (english)
Do physicians respond to financial incentives? We address this question by analyzing the prescription behavior of physicians who are allowed to dispense drugs themselves through onsite pharmacies. Using administrative data comprising over 16 million drug prescriptions between 2008 and 2012 in Upper Austria, a naïve comparison of raw figures reveals that self-dispensing GPs induce 33.2% higher drug expenses than others. Our identification strategy rests on multiple pillars. First, we use an extensive array of covariates along with multi-dimensional fixed effects which account for patient and GP-level heterogeneity as well as sorting of GPs into onsite pharmacies. Second, we use a novel approach that allows us to restrict our sample to randomly allocated patient-GP matches which rules out endogenous sorting as well as principal-agent bargaining over prescriptions between patients and GPs. Contrary to our descriptive analysis, we find evidence that onsite pharmacies have a small negative effect on prescriptions. Although self-dispensing GPs seem to prescribe slightly more expensive medication, this effect is absorbed by a much smaller likelihood to prescribe in the first place, causing the overall effect to be negative.
Keywords (croatian)
Keywords (english)
Languageenglish
Publication typeScientific paper - Other
Publication statusPublished
Peer reviewNo peer review
Publication versionPublished version
Journal titleRadni materijali EIZ-a
Numberingno. 1, pp. 1-25
p-ISSN1846-4238
e-ISSN1847-7844
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:213:677696
Publication2017-04-03
Document URLhttp://hrcak.srce.hr/178966
Type of resourceText
Access conditionsOpen access
Terms of useLicence In copyright icon
Created on2017-08-02 12:45:17