prikaz prve stranice dokumenta Analiza napada na kriptosustav RSA
No public access
master's thesis
Analiza napada na kriptosustav RSA
Zagreb: University of Zagreb, Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing, 2017. urn:nbn:hr:168:899884
Matula, Gustav
University of Zagreb
Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing

Institutional repository: FER Repository

Cite this document

Matula, G. (2017). Analiza napada na kriptosustav RSA (Master's thesis). Zagreb: University of Zagreb, Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing. Retrieved from https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:168:899884

Matula, Gustav. "Analiza napada na kriptosustav RSA." Master's thesis, University of Zagreb, Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing, 2017. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:168:899884

Matula, Gustav. "Analiza napada na kriptosustav RSA." Master's thesis, University of Zagreb, Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing, 2017. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:168:899884

Matula, G. (2017). 'Analiza napada na kriptosustav RSA', Master's thesis, University of Zagreb, Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing, accessed 26 December 2024, https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:168:899884

Matula G. Analiza napada na kriptosustav RSA [Master's thesis]. Zagreb: University of Zagreb, Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing; 2017 [cited 2024 December 26] Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:168:899884

G. Matula, "Analiza napada na kriptosustav RSA", Master's thesis, University of Zagreb, Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing, Zagreb, 2017. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:168:899884

Metadata
TitleAnaliza napada na kriptosustav RSA
Title (english)Analysis of the Attacks on the RSA Cryptosystem
AuthorGustav Matula
MentorAnte Đerek (mentor)
Committee memberAnte Đerek (predsjednik povjerenstva)
Committee memberStjepan Groš (član povjerenstva)
Committee memberAndrea Aglić Aljinović (član povjerenstva)
GranterUniversity of Zagreb
Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing
Zagreb
Defense date and country2017-07-10, Croatia
Scientific / art field,
discipline and subdiscipline		TECHNICAL SCIENCES
Computing
Abstract
Moderni način života ovisi o sigurnosti kriptosustava koje svakodnevno koristimo. Glavni argument za tu sigurnost je činjenica da ih još nitko (barem ne javno) nije probio. Takav argument se na prvu čini slab, ali proučavanjem postojećih pristupa, do- bivamo bolji uvid u razinu sofistikacije potrebnu za uspješan napad, čak i uz korištenje velikodušnih pretpostavki znanja koje je u praksi obično nedostupno. U ovome radu bavimo se dvama takvim napadima na javni kriptosustav RSA koji uz pretpostavke znanja dijela bitova privatnog ključa mogu rekonstruirati ostatak. Jedan od napada je napredna tehnika faktorizacije LFM (Lattice Factoring Method) Boneha Durfeea i Howgrave-Graham baziranu na redukciji baze rešetke. Drugi, napad Heninger i Shac- hama, je elementarniji i koristi iscrpnu pretragu s elegantnim rezanjem grana. Oba napada implementirana su u programskom jeziku C++ (relevantni dijelovi priloženi su na kraju), te je eksperimentalnim mjerenjima potvrd̄eno da su napadi primjenjivi za realistične duljine ključeva. To implicira da curenje vrlo malog broja bitova privatnog ključa čini kriptosustav RSA nesigurnim.
Abstract (english)
The modern way of life depends on the security of cryptosystems we use every day. The main argument for that security is the fact that they have not yet been broken (at least not publicly). That kind of argument seems weak at first, but studying the existing approaches we gain better insight into the level of sophistication needed for a succe- ssful attack even using generous assumptions of knowledge not available in practice. In this thesis, we examine two such attacks on the public cryptosystem RSA, which assume partial knowledge of the private key. The first of these attacks is an advanced factoring technique called the LFM (Lattice Factoring Method) of Boneh, Durfee and Howgrave-Graham based on lattice basis reduction techniques. The second attack, by Heninger and Shacham, is more elementary and works by backtracking with elegant pruning. Both attacks were implemented in the C++ programming language (the re- levant parts are supplied at the end), and experimental measurements have confirmed that the attacks are applicable to realistic key lengths. This implies that any leakage of even a small number of private key bits renders the RSA cryptosystem insecure.
Keywords
Keywords (english)
Languagecroatian
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:168:899884
Study programmeTitle: Computing
Study programme type: university
Study level: graduate
Academic / professional title: magistar/magistra inženjer/inženjerka računarstva (magistar/magistra inženjer/inženjerka računarstva)
Type of resourceText
File originBorn digital
Access conditionsClosed access
Terms of useLicence In copyright icon
Public note
Created on2019-03-13 22:53:59