The dissertation primarily focuses on rethinking contemporary philosophical problems in relation to the new social perspective emerged within the neurodiversity movement. More specifically, the dissertation explores the philosophical perspectives of autism through three philosophical disciplines and three related fundamental issues. The first topic is derived our everyday socio-epistemic practices of testimonial exchange and trust assessment. In the process of attributing the credibility to epistemic subjects, unjustified stereotypes and prejudices related to certain social groups, their social status, and their (in) abilities, are often being key elements in the assessment. Cases of epistemic injustices that are at the center of the occupation of the doctoral thesis are those in which informers are subject to epistemic injustice based on their medical conditions - Autism Spectrum Disorder. The injustices manifests, above all, in the neglection of the significant cognitive potentials of autistic persons, stigmatization, and epistemic silencing. The consequences of such treatment are primarily epistemic, in a manner of loss of epistemic courage and deprivation of new (autistic) insights, but they also delve into practices of political decisions and policy-making. Persistent epistemic discrimination of autistic persons is related with the wrong attribution of values of autistic lives, as the neglect of epistemic potential of autistics causes some discrimination of the eugenic type and influences reproductive decisions and practices of genetic selection. Further, epistemic injustice caused by negative stereotypes and prejudices is tied to corrupt moral attitudes society holds on autistic individuals, which makes these practices inseparable from ethical discussions about the well being of the individual. Notably, autistic well-being is affected by said epistemic treatment, as advocated by proponents of the neurodiversity movement. At the core of the movement is the thought of autism as neurological diversity, which clearly raises the issue of health policies and the growing debate on whether autism should be treated at all. Considering the complexity of philosophical perspectives about autism elaborated in this dissertation, three aims could be extracted: first, to investigate the practices of epistemic injustice directed towards autistic persons and the consequences of such treatments; second, to tackle the moral consequences of discrimination of autistic cognitive potentials traced in value judgment of autistic lives; third, to relate moral attitudes about autism with political practices of policy making in health sectors. The above mentioned aims are connected to the idea of the proposed devaluation of autistic cognitive potentials rooted in improper epistemic practices, which withdraws the general aim of the dissertation: to start a discussion on the integration of autistic persons into a society that begins with their integration into the epistemic community, in addition to unbiased evaluation of their epistemic contributions and potentials.