Abstract (english) | Ethics as one of the key philosophical disciplines was strongly criticized by Hegel and Marx, the two very important and influential philosophers. In other words, they tried to overcome morality as such and along with it ethics as a philosophical reflection of that phenomenon as well. That overcoming mostly functioned by Hegel's category of realization through sublation (die Aufhebung). Hegel's critique of the moral consciousness in The Phenomenology of Spirit was firstly directed at the contradictions of Kant's ethics and it was supposed to be overcome in the spheres of religion and absolute knowledge. A changed form of this critique continued in the book Elements of the Philosophy of Right, in which morality, together with the abstract right are overcome on a higher level, by ethical life. According to Hegel, the main drawback of the ethical position is the unresolved Is-Ought duality. Marx's critique of the ethical position as such comes from its alienated nature. For Marx, morality represents one of the forms of ideological upgrade on the material base. He starts from the overcoming of philosophy, in the sense of its realization, and with it, ethics has to be realized through the sublation of philosophy. However, in many parts of Marx's files we find thesis from which the overcoming can be understood as liquidation, i.e. total destruction. The attempts of overcoming ethics resulted defective, mostly for its contradictions. The request for the identity of Is and Ought, for overcoming ethics, sets itself as a kind of Ought, as a normative principle. In the end, ethics places itself as a philosophical discipline inseparable from human nature, and the moral act receives meaning in the constant realization just as a man who receives meaning from continuous becoming human. |