Conceptual or ontological relativism is the view that reality, or at least anything that we can say about it, is relative to some conceptual scheme and that multiple possible conceptual schemes and ontologies exist. Conceptual schemes are, broadly speaking, ways of organising experience, points of view from which individuals, cultures and periods look at the world. Conceptual relativism is usually held to be untenable, because of the usual objections to relativism – that it is self-refuting and leads to an infinite regress – as well as because of Donald Davidson’s influential critique from 1974. The goal of this master’s thesis is to see whether a tenable conceptual relativism is possible, one that can answer or be immune to the aforementioned criticism. After the introduction, in which the motivation for the subject matter of the thesis and a general overview of conceptual relativism are given, in Chapter 2 we turn to W.V.O. Quine and his account of ontological relativity. Chapter 3 deals with a conceptual-relativist reading of T. Kuhn’s theory of science, with special attention given to incommensurability. In Chapter 4, Davidson’s critique of the very idea of conceptual schemes is analysed and criticised, whereas Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the relationship between conceptual relativism and truth based on the work of H. Putnam, I. Hacking and N. Rescher. Chapter 6 is reserved for the final discussion.