This master`s thesis discusses a well known philosophical term. The thing in itself, as a concept, idea, term, is the main subject of this thesis. The introduction provides basic postulates of Kant`s transcendental aesthetics and transcendental logic, thus allowing the reader to gain better understanding of the context in which the term was created. Primary focus is put on Kant`s perspectives about the nature and limits of human knowledge, which result in his „humble“ claim about the unknownability of things in themselves. This very claim will be the starting point in defining the term “thing in itself”. After a short introduction, the basic explanation of the meaning of „the thing in itself“ is provided, as well as some basic interpretations of this concept. The second part of this master`s thesis focuses on some problematic questions regarding the things in themselves, as well as on some significant objections and views which resulted from those questions. The reader is reminded that different philosophers tend to interpret Kant`s philosophical thoughts in a different way. The emphasis will mostly be on Kant`s problematic distinction between appearances and things in themselves and opposed interpretations of that distinction. Dealing with these questions will indirectly reveal different ways of interpreting the thing in itself, and therefore point out the opposing views about the meaning of this concept as well as Kant`s motivation for it`s introduction. The final part will then look back on the problem of interpretation of the thing in itself, while indicating disadvantages of the earlier mentioned interpretations. The conclusion will offer a short summary of previous chapters and look back on the question from the title of this thesis: „Is the thing in itself a redundant concept or an epistemic ideal?“