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Scientific paper - Original scientific paper
Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle
International journal of philosophical studies, 29 (2021), 3; 351-369. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2021.1970790
Grgić, Filip

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Grgić, F. (2021). Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle. International journal of philosophical studies, 29. (3), 351-369. doi: 10.1080/09672559.2021.1970790

Grgić, Filip. "Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle." International journal of philosophical studies, vol. 29, no. 3, 2021, pp. 351-369. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2021.1970790

Grgić, Filip. "Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle." International journal of philosophical studies 29, no. 3 (2021): 351-369. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2021.1970790

Grgić, F. (2021) 'Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle', International journal of philosophical studies, 29(3), pp. 351-369. doi: 10.1080/09672559.2021.1970790

Grgić F. Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle. International journal of philosophical studies [Internet]. 2021 [cited 2024 November 29];29(3):351-369. doi: 10.1080/09672559.2021.1970790

F. Grgić, "Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle", International journal of philosophical studies, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 351-369, 2021. [Online]. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:783326. [Accessed: 29 November 2024]

Metadata
Title (english)Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle
AuthorFilip Grgić
Author's institutionInstitute of Philosophy
Scientific / art field,
discipline and subdiscipline		HUMANISTIC SCIENCES
Philosophy
Abstract (english)
This paper is a discussion of Aristotle’s account of actions that come about because of ignorance as found in his Nicomachean Ethics 3.1. I argue that such actions do not originate in the agent, but can rather be seen as a subclass of lucky events. Aristotle makes a distinction between two types of actions that come about because of ignorance: those that are painful or regretted (involuntary actions) and those that are not (non-voluntary actions). I argue that involuntary actions that come about because of ignorance are painful for basically the same reason as forced actions. They include the mismatch between the person’s capacity as the agent and the fact that it happened to her that she did something even though, qua agent, she contributed nothing, so that she is reduced, as it were, to the mere vehicle of luck.
Keywords (english)
Languageenglish
Publication typeScientific paper - Original scientific paper
Publication statusPublished
Peer reviewPeer review - international
Publication versionPublished version
Journal titleInternational journal of philosophical studies
Numberingvol. 29, no. 3, pp. 351-369
p-ISSN0967-2559
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2021.1970790
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:261:783326
Publication2021
Document URLhttp://bib.irb.hr/1143804
Type of resourceText
Access conditionsInstitutional access
Terms of useLicence In copyright icon
Created on2023-03-20 10:00:02