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Scientific paper - Chapter in Book
Consequences of Hard Incompatibilism
In: Freiheit und Detrerminismus / Arndt, Andreas; Zovko, Jure (Ed.). Hannover: Wehrhahn Verlag, 2012. pp. 143-150. urn:nbn:hr:261:535405
Pećnjak, Davor

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Pećnjak, D. (2012). Consequences of Hard Incompatibilism. In A. Arndt, (Ed.), J. Zovko, (Ed.), Freiheit und Detrerminismus (pp. 143-150). Hannover: Wehrhahn Verlag. Retrieved from https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:535405

Pećnjak, Davor. "Consequences of Hard Incompatibilism." Freiheit und Detrerminismus, edited by Andreas Arndt, edited by Jure Zovko, Wehrhahn Verlag, 2012, pp. 143-150. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:535405

Pećnjak, Davor. "Consequences of Hard Incompatibilism." In Freiheit und Detrerminismus, edited by Andreas Arndt, edited by Jure Zovko, 143-150. Hannover: Wehrhahn Verlag, 2012. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:535405

Pećnjak, D. (2012) 'Consequences of Hard Incompatibilism' in Arndt, A. (ed.), Zovko, J. (ed.) Freiheit und Detrerminismus Hannover: Wehrhahn Verlag, pp. 143-150. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:535405 (Accessed 25 November 2024)

Pećnjak D. Consequences of Hard Incompatibilism. In: A. Arndt, ed., J. Zovko, ed. Freiheit und Detrerminismus. Hannover: Wehrhahn Verlag; 2012. Pp. 143-150. [cited 2024 November 25] Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:535405

D. Pećnjak, "Consequences of Hard Incompatibilism", Freiheit und Detrerminismus, A. Arndt and J. Zovko, Eds. Hannover: Wehrhahn Verlag, 2012, pp. 143-150. [Online] Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:535405

Metadata
Title (english)Consequences of Hard Incompatibilism
AuthorDavor Pećnjak
EditorAndreas Arndt
EditorJure Zovko
Author's institutionInstitute of Philosophy
Scientific / art field,
discipline and subdiscipline		HUMANISTIC SCIENCES
Philosophy
Abstract (english)
Incompatibilists in the free will debate are either determinists or libertarians. Both of these positions can have its variants. I would like to discuss several claims of the variant which was developed by Derk Pereboom and which he dubs hard incompatibilism. In the light of how Pereboom develops and defends hard incompatibilism against the objections from the so-called “requirement for robust alternative possibilities” and against compatibilism, (and I almost completely agree with all the main points of Pereboom’s defence), I would nevertheles like to show that some points he also defends, could not stay as he says.
Keywords (english)
Languageenglish
Publication typeScientific paper - Chapter in Book
Publication statusPublished
Peer reviewPeer review
Publication versionPublished version
Book titleFreiheit und Detrerminismus
Numberingpp. 143-150
ISBN978-3-86525-284-5
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:261:535405
Publication2012
ProjectNumber: 191-0091328-1091
Title (croatian): Pitanje slobode volje i problem svijesti
Title (english): Question About Free Will and the Problem of Consciousness
Leader: Davor Pećnjak
Jurisdiction: Croatia
Funding stream: ZP
Type of resourceText
PublisherWehrhahn Verlag
Publishing placeHannover
Access conditionsOpen access
Terms of useLicence In copyright icon
Created on2021-06-15 12:01:10