Title Libertarijanistička teorija slobode volje : doktorski rad
Title (english) Libertarian theory of free will
Author Filip Čeč
Mentor Boran Berčić (mentor)
Committee member Nenad Smokrović (predsjednik povjerenstva)
Committee member Boran Berčić (član povjerenstva)
Committee member Danilo Šuster (član povjerenstva) strani drzavljanin: Nije dostupno
Granter University of Rijeka Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences (Department of Philosophy) Rijeka
Defense date and country 2013-11-29, Croatia
Scientific / art field, discipline and subdiscipline HUMANISTIC SCIENCES Philosophy
Universal decimal classification (UDC ) 11/12 - Metaphysics. Ontology. Cosmology. Aesthetics
Abstract U ovom radu zastupam tezu prema kojoj slobodu volje valja razumjeti kao
kontrolu nad alternativnim mogućnostima odluĉivanja, kontrolu koja se moţe
osigurati samo u indeterministiĉkom svijetu. Metodološki okvir unutar kojeg branim
vlastitu tezu moţe se okarakterizirati kao empirijski osviještena konceptualna analiza.
Nastojao sam obraniti održivost takvog tradicionalnog metodološkog pristupa
dokazujući neosnovanost kritika upućenih od strane negativnog programa
eksperimentalne filozofije. Pri tome sam odbacio i pristup onih koji jedan dio rasprave
o slobodi volje nastoje prikazati kao metafiziĉki irelevantan.
Tvrdim da je kompatibilistiĉki pristup raspravi o slobodi volje neprihvatljiv.
Smatram da argumente pomoću kojih kompatibilisti brane mogućnost drugaĉijeg
postupanja u deterministiĉkom svijetu valja odbaciti te uz pomoć argumenta
posljedice nastojim pokazati neodrživost ideje drugaĉijeg postupanja u tom istom
svijetu. Mišljenja sam da se uz pomoć više argumenata može pokazati da
determinizam nije kompatibilan ni sa slobodom formuliranom u terminima
djelatnikovog autorstva radnji.
Frankfurtovu kritiku principa alternativnih mogućnosti nastojim odbaciti na
temelju argumenta dileme, ĉime pokazujem opravdanost prakse atribucije moralne
odgovornosti koja se temelji na našoj mogućnosti drugaĉijeg odluĉivanja.
Sagledavajući opravdanost formuliranja libertarijanistiĉke teorije slobode volje
odbacujem argumente kojima se indeterminizam nastoji prikazati kao prepreka
slobodnom odluĉivanju. Pri tome nastojim pokazati konstruktivnu ulogu koju
indeterminizam ima prilikom formuliranja teze slobode volje shvaćene kao kontrole
nad alternativnim mogućnostima odluĉivanja. Kod postizanja tog cilja
libertarijanistiĉke teorije događajnog uzrokovanja kao i ne-uzroĉne teorije pokazale
su se kao neprimjerene. Stoga smatram i branim tvrdnju da slobodu volje shvaćenu
kao kontrolu nad alternativnim mogućnostima odluĉivanja moţemo plauzibilno
formulirati jedino unutar libertarijanistiĉke teorije događajnog uzrokovanja.
Abstract (english) The main thesis of this dissertation is that free will, if understood as a thesis
about control over alternative possibilities, can be plausibly formulated only in an
indeterministic world. An empirically sensitive conceptual analysis has been adopted
as the methodological framework within which such a thesis is formulated. Such an
analysis can be criticized from two separate philosophical standpoints: the negative
program of experimental philosophy and the work of naturalistically inclined
philosophers who believe that several questions formulated within the free will debate
are metaphysically irrelevant. I have tried to show that these criticisms are ill
formulated and cannot prove what they purport to prove.
In order to prove the main thesis of this dissertation, I hold that several
aspects of the compatibilist approach are unacceptable. Namely, by relying on the
consequence argument, I argue that it is implausible to suppose that one can act
otherwise in a deterministic world. I also find unacceptable the idea that freedom,
conceived as control over the production of actions, is compatible with determinism.
Using the prior-sign dilemma defense I respond to Frankfurt‟s criticism of the
principle of alternative possibilities and, by doing so, I defend the idea that our
practice of holding someone morally responsible can be safely grounded in the
possibility of deciding to act otherwise.
In order to justify the application of a libertarian approach to the conception of
freedom as control over alternative possibilities, several problems inherent to that
approach have to be addressed. I argue that indeterminism should not be considered
as a threat to free will, rather it should be regarded as constitutive of our ability to
decide to act otherwise. I reject the approach to libertarianism that relies on special
forms of agent causation and approaches that remain silent on the issue of causation
of decisions. Therefore I defend the idea that the only available libertarian approach
which can guarantee control over alternative possibilities is one that is formulated
within the theory of event causation.
Keywords
Sloboda volje
determinizam
indeterminizam
libertarijanizam
kompatibilizam
eksperimentalna filozofija
argument posljedice
kondicionalna analiza
princip alternativnih mogućnosti
djelatnikovo uzrokovanje
događajno uzrokovanje.
Keywords (english)
Free Will
Determinism
Indeterminism
Libertarianism
Compatibilism
Experimental Philosophy
Consequence Argument
Conditional Analysis
Principle of Alternative Possibilities
Agent Causation
Event Causation.
Language croatian
URN:NBN urn:nbn:hr:188:780996
Study programme Title: Postgraduate doctoral study programme Philosophy and Contemporaneity Study programme type: university Study level: postgraduate Academic / professional title: doktor/doktorica znanosti, područje humanističkih znanosti, polje filozofija (doktor/doktorica znanosti, područje humanističkih znanosti, polje filozofija)
Catalog URL https://libraries.uniri.hr/cgi-bin/unilib.cgi?form=D1130406007
Type of resource Text
Extent 281 str.
File origin Born digital
Access conditions Open access
Terms of use
Created on 2017-01-19 17:54:35