prikaz prve stranice dokumenta Komparativna analiza razloga raspada iračke vojske 2014. i afganistanske vojske 2021. godine
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master's thesis
Komparativna analiza razloga raspada iračke vojske 2014. i afganistanske vojske 2021. godine
Zagreb: University of Zagreb, 2022. urn:nbn:hr:249:565570
Toupal, Robert
University of Zagreb
Croatian Defence Academy "Dr. Franjo Tuđman"

Institutional repository: Repository of Croatian Defence Academy "Dr. Franjo Tuđman"

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Toupal, R. (2022). Komparativna analiza razloga raspada iračke vojske 2014. i afganistanske vojske 2021. godine (Master's thesis). Zagreb: University of Zagreb. Retrieved from https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:249:565570

Toupal, Robert. "Komparativna analiza razloga raspada iračke vojske 2014. i afganistanske vojske 2021. godine." Master's thesis, University of Zagreb, 2022. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:249:565570

Toupal, Robert. "Komparativna analiza razloga raspada iračke vojske 2014. i afganistanske vojske 2021. godine." Master's thesis, University of Zagreb, 2022. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:249:565570

Toupal, R. (2022). 'Komparativna analiza razloga raspada iračke vojske 2014. i afganistanske vojske 2021. godine', Master's thesis, University of Zagreb, accessed 04 December 2024, https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:249:565570

Toupal R. Komparativna analiza razloga raspada iračke vojske 2014. i afganistanske vojske 2021. godine [Master's thesis]. Zagreb: University of Zagreb; 2022 [cited 2024 December 04] Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:249:565570

R. Toupal, "Komparativna analiza razloga raspada iračke vojske 2014. i afganistanske vojske 2021. godine", Master's thesis, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, 2022. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:249:565570

Metadata
TitleKomparativna analiza razloga raspada iračke vojske 2014. i afganistanske vojske 2021. godine
Title (english)A Comparative Analysis of the Reasons for the Disintegration of the Iraqi Army in 2014 and the Afghan Army in 2021
AuthorRobert Toupal
MentorRobert Mikac (mentor)
MentorGoran Boroš (komentor)
Committee memberGoran Đukić (predsjednik povjerenstva)
Committee memberRobert Mikac (član povjerenstva)
Committee memberGoran Boroš (član povjerenstva)
GranterUniversity of Zagreb
(Croatian Defence Academy "Dr. Franjo Tuđman")
Zagreb
Defense date and country2022-07-04, Croatia
Scientific / art field,
discipline and subdiscipline		SOCIAL SCIENCES
Security and Defense Science
Abstract
Sjedinjene Američke Države su nakon intervencije u Iraku i Afganistanu pokrenule proces izgradnje potpuno novog državnog uređenja temeljenog na demokraciji i građanskim pravima. Za zaštitu tih država ustrojene su nove oružane snage navedenih država u koje su SAD i saveznici uložili milijarde dolara i velik trud nebrojenih instruktora i savjetnika. Usprkos svemu ovome te su se organizacije raspale prilikom prvog značajnog sučeljavanja s ozbiljnim protivnikom. Iračka vojska doživjela je kolaps 2014. u naletu ISIL-a, a afganistanska vojska u talibanskoj ljetnoj ofenzivi 2021. godine. Cilj ovog rada je razjasniti čimbenike koji su utjecali na njihov poraz. Hipoteza koja se u njemu brani govori da je manjak motivacije vladinih snaga ključan za njihov neuspjeh. ISIL i talibani iskoristili su nefunkcionalnost države i duboke podjele u društvu, kako bi uz manji broj visokomotiviranih boraca nadjačali veće, bolje opremljene ali slabije motivirane vladine snage. Manjak motivacije vladinih snaga uzrokovan je slabom vjerom u nefunkcionalnu i korumpiranu državu kao i u vrijednosti koje je ona predstavljala.
Abstract (english)
After the intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States started the process of building a completely new states based on democracy and civil rights. New armed forces of these states have been formed to protect these countries, in which the United States have investedbillions of dollars with its Allies, and the great efforts of countless instructors and advisers. Despite all this, these organizations disintegrated on their first contact with a serious adversary. The Iraqi army experienced a collapse in 2014 in war against ISIL, and the Afghan army in the Taliban summer offensive in 2021. The aim of this paper is to clarify the factors that influenced their defeat. The hypothesis defended in it says that the lack of motivation of government forces is key to their failure. ISIL and the Taliban took advantage of state dysfunction and deep divisions in society to overpower larger, better-equipped but less motivated government forces with a small number of highly motivated fighters. The lack of motivation of government forces was caused by a weak faith in a dysfunctional and corrupt state as well as in the values it represented.
Keywords
Keywords (english)
Languagecroatian
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:249:565570
Study programmeTitle: Military Leadership and Management
Study programme type: university
Study level: graduate
Academic / professional title: MAGISTAR/MAGISTRA VOJNOG VOĐENJA I UPRAVLJANJA (MAGISTAR/MAGISTRA VOJNOG VOĐENJA I UPRAVLJANJA)
Type of resourceText
File originBorn digital
Access conditionsClosed access
Terms of useLicence In copyright icon
Created on2023-02-08 14:53:25