Title Neformalne logičke pogreške u javnom diskursu
Author Živana Škorić
Mentor Majda Trobok (mentor)
Mentor Aleksandra Golubović (komentor)
Committee member Aleksandra Golubović (predsjednik povjerenstva)
Committee member Iris Vidmar Jovanović (član povjerenstva)
Granter University of Rijeka Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences (Department of Philosophy) Rijeka
Defense date and country 2024-09-23, Croatia
Scientific / art field, discipline and subdiscipline HUMANISTIC SCIENCES Philosophy
Abstract U diplomskom radu napravljen je pregled nekih od najčešćih neformalnih logičkih pogrešaka u javnom diskursu. Nastao je uviđanjem široke uporabe logičkih pogrešaka u javnom prostoru i potrebe za formiranjem argumentacije prema logičkim
pravilima. Logičke pogreške u širem smislu obuhvaćaju sve pogreške u zaključivanju, a u užem označavaju tipične pogreške koje
činimo dok zaključujemo. U tradicionalnom pristupu logičara ovoj problematici prevladavaju dedukcija i indukcija kao metode ispravnog zaključivanja, dok suvremeni pristupi logičkim pogreškama uvažavaju potrebu za dodatnim logičkim alatima u svrhu procjene argumenata u javnom diskursu. Naime, ukoliko bismo prihvatili samo navedenu dihotomiju, kao što naglašavaju
Johnson i Blair u svojoj Logičkoj samoobrani, mogli bismo govoriti isključivo o dobrim i jakim argumentima na koje se rijetko nailazi u raspravama. Iz tog razloga spomenuti autori argumente smještaju na spektar, gdje su na početku jako dobri argumenti, na kraju se nalaze jako loši, dok je većina argumenata negdje na sredini. Dobri argumenti zadovoljavaju tri kriterija: kriterij
relevantnosti, prema kojem premise argumenta moraju biti relevantne za konkluziju, kriterij dostatnosti, prema kojem premise argumenta moraju pružiti dostatnu podršku konkluziji, te kriterij prihvatljivosti, koji traži da premise budu vrijedne prihvaćanja i od osobe koja ih zastupa i od publike kojoj se argument predstavlja. Suvremeni pristup Johnsona i Blaira neformalnim logičkim
pogreškama pristup je koji prati i ovaj rad te u svrhu toga detaljno analizira tri vrste neformalnih logičkih pogrešaka, od kojih svaka krši po jedan od navedenih kriterija dobrog argumenta. Za analizu logičkih pogrešaka korišteni su stvarni, aktualni i intrigantni primjeri iz različitih sfera znanosti i društva. Iako logičke pogreške neće nestati iz javnog diskursa, svijest o njima te znanje o načinima ispravnog zaključivanja predstavljaju temelje svake zdrave i konstruktivne diskusije.
Abstract (english) The thesis provides an overview of some of the most common informal logical fallacies in public discourse. It came about as a result of recognizing the wide use of logical fallacies in the public sphere and the need to form arguments according to logical rules. Logical fallacies in the broad sense include all fallacies in reasoning, and in the narrow sense they refer to the typical fallacies that we make while inferring. In the traditional logician approach to this issue, it is deduction and induction that prevail as methods of correct reasoning, while modern approaches to logical fallacies recognize the need for additional logical tools for the purpose of evaluating arguments in public discourse. Namely, if we were to accept only the aforementioned dichotomy, as emphasized by Johnson and Blair in their Logical Self-Defense, we would be able to talk of
sound and strong arguments exclusively, the kind we rarely come across in debates. For this reason, these authors place arguments on a spectrum, where very good arguments are at the beginning, very bad are placed at the end, and most arguments fall somewhere in the middle. Good arguments meet three standards: the standard of relevance, according to which the premises of an argument must be relevant to the conclusion, the standard of sufficiency, according to which the premises of an argument must provide sufficient support for the conclusion, and the standard of acceptability, which requires that the premises of an argument be worthy of acceptance by the person who represents them and the audience to whom the argument is presented. Johnson's and Blair's contemporary approach to informal logical fallacies is the approach taken in this thesis as well, and for that purpose three types of informal logical fallacies have been analyzed, each of which violates one of the stated standards of a good argument. Real, up-to-date and intriguing examples from different areas of science and society have been used for the analysis of logical fallacies. Although logical fallacies will not disappear from public discourse, having the awareness of them and the knowledge of correct reasoning is what makes the foundation of every healthy and constructive discussion.
Keywords
argument
zaključivanje
rasprava
neformalne logičke pogreške
Keywords (english)
argument
reasoning
discussion
informal logical fallacies
Language croatian
URN:NBN urn:nbn:hr:186:901369
Study programme Title: Philosophy (double major); specializations in: General Track, Teaching Track Course: Teaching Track Study programme type: university Study level: graduate Academic / professional title: sveučilišni/a magistar/magistra filozofije (sveučilišni/a magistar/magistra filozofije)
Study programme Title: English Language and Literature (double major); specializations in: Teaching Track Course: Teaching Track Study programme type: university Study level: graduate Academic / professional title: sveučilišni/a magistar/magistra edukacije engleskog jezika i književnosti (sveučilišni/a magistar/magistra edukacije engleskog jezika i književnosti)
Type of resource Text
File origin Born digital
Access conditions Open access
Terms of use
Created on 2024-09-12 10:21:31