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Bending and Stretching the Definition of Lying
Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 20 (2020), 59; 247-256. urn:nbn:hr:186:523860
Blečić, Martina

Institucijski repozitorij: Repozitorij Filozofskog fakulteta Rijeka

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Blečić, M. (2020). Bending and Stretching the Definition of Lying. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 20. (59), 247-256. Preuzeto s https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:523860

Blečić, Martina. "Bending and Stretching the Definition of Lying." Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 20, br. 59, 2020, str. 247-256. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:523860

Blečić, Martina. "Bending and Stretching the Definition of Lying." Croatian Journal of Philosophy 20, br. 59 (2020): 247-256. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:523860

Blečić, M. (2020) 'Bending and Stretching the Definition of Lying', Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 20(59), str. 247-256. Preuzeto s: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:523860 (Datum pristupa: 28.11.2024.)

Blečić M. Bending and Stretching the Definition of Lying. Croatian Journal of Philosophy [Internet]. 2020. [pristupljeno 28.11.2024.];20(59):247-256. Dostupno na: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:523860

M. Blečić, "Bending and Stretching the Definition of Lying", Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 20, br. 59, str. 247-256, 2020. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:523860. [Citirano: 28.11.2024.]

Za citiranje koristite ovu mrežnu adresu: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:523860
Podaci o radu
Naslov (engleski)Bending and Stretching the Definition of Lying
AutorMartina Blečić
Autorova ustanovaSveučilište u Rijeci
Filozofski fakultet
Znanstveno / umjetničko
područje, polje i grana		HUMANISTIČKE ZNANOSTI
Filozofija
Sažetak (engleski)
One of the recent trends in dealing with the concept of lying has been to argue that the idea that one needs to deceive someone in order to lie has been accepted too hastily. In Lying and Insincerity Stokke shares this opinion and proposes a definition of lying based on the notion of common ground that includes bald-faced lies. Additionally, he rejects the idea that lying can be accomplished with pragmatic means such as conversational implicatures and proposes a formal distinction between lying and misleading. In this review, I present the content of Stokke’s book and critically discuss the two points mentioned above.
Ključne riječi (engleski)
Jezikengleski
Vrsta publikacijeOstalo - Prikaz, pregled, osvrt
Status objaveObjavljen
Vrsta recenzijeRecenziran
Verzija publikacijeObjavljena verzija rada (izdavačev PDF)
Naslov časopisaCroatian Journal of Philosophy
Brojčani podacivol. 20, br. 59, str. 247-256
p-ISSN1333-1108
e-ISSN1847-6139
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:186:523860
Datum objave publikacije2020
URL dokumentahttps://hrcak.srce.hr/253657
Vrsta resursaTekst
Prava pristupaOtvoreni pristup
Uvjeti korištenjaIkona licence Zaštićeno autorskim pravom.
Datum i vrijeme pohrane2022-12-13 07:47:21