In this paper the specific properties of the language of poetry, in the context of philosophy of poetry and philosophy of literature, are presented. The initial part of the paper outlines the key concepts regarding the language of poetry, which will be necessary for understanding the discussion on the unity of form and content, and the possibility of paraphrase in poetry. The questions regarding the possibility of paraphrasing poetry and unity of form and content pertain to simple intuitions regarding whether or not it is possible to express in other words something a poem expresses, as well as wether the way the content of a poem is expressed affects the content itself. The paper argues that Peter Kivy's arguments about the possibility and necessity of paraphrase in the cases of interpretation are based on intuitions which are fundamentally semantic, while Peter Lamarque's arguments which are concerned with the the value and experience of poetry, are distinctly pragmatic. From this it is inferred that, if we keep in mind the conventions of readers which constitute the poetic practice in society, we cannot allow paraphrase within that same practice. The semantic approach which allows for conveying the meaning of a poem in other words, violates the fundamental normative rules of poetic practice, which makes poetry possible in the first place. Therefore, if the institutional definition of poetry is accepted, which consists of the relation between the readers, the works and the authors, and which corresponds to this pragmatic approach of meaning, paraphrasing poetry isn't possible, normatively and by definition.