In accordance with the fact that we have witnessed a change in the status of philosophy among other sciences over the last two hundred years compared to its previous esteemed multicentury status on the one hand, and the various current crises in Europe of which we are active participants on the other hand, this dissertation has the obligation to explore the problem of philosophy and the question of Europe - considering Martin Heidegger's Veröffentlichte Schriften. The hypothesis is as follows: if Heidegger's research projects of „Destruction“ and „Overcoming“ culminate in the thesis of the „End of Philosophy,“ it follows that his teachings on the „Europe’s Future“ are based on research projects of „Destruction,“ „Overcoming,“ and ultimately the thesis of the „End of Philosophy.“ Explaining this: the hypothesis claims that Heidegger's teachings, such as the teachings on the future of Europe, are inseparably linked to his teachings on metaphysics, such as the teachings on the „End.“ Given that such a formulated hypothesis requires a systematic research approach, it will be based on two theses as positions, assertions, initial assumptions that have the status of fundamental viewpoints that need to be supported by arguments and evidence to be defended, ensuring the consistency and validity of the research process. Thus, in the first part of the work, the thesis that Heidegger's thesis on the „End of Philosophy“ represents a deepening, intensification, or radicalization of what the „Destruction“ project and the „Overcoming“ project entail will be proven - all argued and demonstrated based on Heidegger's main works from all three periods of thought. In the second part of the work, the thesis that Heidegger - in his speeches about what is European, in which the World has sunk - gives primacy to the future as the primary phenomenon of true temporality, interpreting and finally exposing the arrival of the future in the present, will be proven - all argued and demonstrated based on Heidegger's main works from all three periods of thought. Finally, the results of all the research are to confirm the meticulousness of the initially postulated hypothesis, culminating in the explication of the postulated hypothesis, which is elucidated by the very title of the proposed research titled: „The End of Philosophy and Question of the Europe’s Future in the Work of Martin Heidegger,“ whose ultimate goal is to pose the question: what is man!? First part of dissertation: philosophy historians, interpreters, and thinkers agree that Martin Heidegger explicitly presented the thesis of the end of philosophy in the third period of his thought - even in the title of one of his lectures. Although such a thesis can be found in hints in many works of Heidegger's third thinking period, the explicit presentation of the end of philosophy thesis took place in a lecture titled „The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking“ (“Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens”) in 1964. This lecture summarizes the entirety of Heidegger's thinking by directly referring to the first thinking period when the project of Destruction of the history of ontology began, guided by the question of Sein, as well as to the second thinking period when the project of Overcoming metaphysics began. Precisely in line with this, in this part of the work, there is an intention to relate all three mentioned thinking periods in a way that proves Heidegger's thesis on the End of Philosophy is actually a deepening, sharpening, or radicalization of „Destruction“ and „Overcoming“: in a way that Heidegger's thesis on the End of Philosophy contains the project of Destructing ontology and the project of Overcoming metaphysics as the expected development of „Destruction“ and „Overcoming“. In particular, the ultimate goal of this part of the work is to show how the discussion of Heidegger's third thinking period - in this case, the thesis on the End of Philosophy - cannot or is difficult to be carried out sufficiently without relating it to Heidegger's first and second thinking periods - in this case, the projects of Destruction of the history of ontology guided by the question of Sein and overcoming metaphysics. The concept of „Destructing“ as an unfinished continuous verb is derived from the concept of „Destruction“ (Destruktion), which Heidegger first mentions in his main work from 1927 titled „Sein und Zeit“. Interestingly, „Destruction“ comes from the Latin word „Destructio“ in the feminine gender of the dative case, meaning destruction, degradation, demolition, ruin - although throughout his entire opus, Heidegger insists that we should think in Greek. However, despite being a Latin term, Heidegger's definition of Destruction is related to the history of ontology carried out by following the thread of the ancient question of Sein. And, because „destruction“ represents a process guided by the question of Sein, this part of the work will explore how the concept of Sein behaves in Heidegger's implementation of such a process, how the concept of Sein behaves when posed in the form of a question that is actually the guiding principle of the announced process of destructing the history of ontology, and what results were particularly achieved in the conclusions of Heidegger's research. And, in line with the fact that it is widely known that Heidegger's project of „Destruction“ is not finally concluded - which he personally acknowledges in the corpus of lectures, discussions, and speeches of the third thinking period - here, „Destruction“ is determined by „Destructing“ as an unfinished continuous verb that corresponds to the concept of „Overcoming“ in Heidegger's project of Overcoming metaphysics during the second thinking period. Such a tendency suggests that Heidegger's projects of „Destruction“ and „Overcoming“ have an unfinished character that continues with the thesis of the End of Philosophy, which is yet to be proven by following the behavior of the concept of Sein in the relevant projects: initially, in the project of Destructing the history of ontology guided by the question of Sein as the project of Heidegger's first thinking period. And, this will be explored through Heidegger's main works of the first thinking period: initially, the presentation will be focused on Heidegger's main work from 1927 titled „Being and Time“ („Sein und Zeit“) and then the work from 1929 titled „Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics“ („Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik“). Finally, this will be conducted through the exposition of the ontic sketch for later ontological research, then based on ontological research on the ontic sketch, and outlining the problem of fundamental ontology through the question of the origin of founding metaphysics, the question of founding metaphysics in its originality, and the question of the problem of metaphysics as the problem of fundamental ontology. The concept of „Overcoming“ („Überwindung“) as an unfinished continuous verb is, in fact, the concept that defines Heidegger's second thinking period. And - whether the project of Destructing the history of ontology carried out by following the thread of the question of Sein is understood as a completed or unfinished process to be kept isolated in relation to Heidegger's later thinking, or simply understanding the project of „Overcoming“ metaphysics as a continuation of the „Destruction“ project - historians of philosophy, interpreters, and thinkers state that the change in Heidegger's relation to the question of Sein in relation to the first thinking period is evident. However, the apparent change in Heidegger's approach to the question of Sein facilitated by the project of „Overcoming“ actually turns out to be an expected sequence according to evidently unfinished or even (not) delivered results of research conducted during the „Destruction“ period. And because „Overcoming“ actually represents a process that, by its very title, indicates that it is an unfinished continuous verb, suggesting an undertaking that is a continuum, in this part of the work, it will be explored how the concept of Sein behaves in Heidegger's implementation of such a process that is already determined as unfinished, how the concept of Sein behaves when posed in the process of Overcoming, and what results were particularly achieved in the conclusions of Heidegger's research on Overcoming as an unfinished process. Therefore, what needs attention in this case is that Heidegger himself determines „Overcoming“ as a process, unlike „Destruction,“ which in the first thinking period is addressed by a noun, although the process of „Destructing“ ultimately indicates that it is destruction as an unfinished continuous verb! Such a tendency suggests that Heidegger's projects of „Destruction“ and „Overcoming“ have an unfinished character that concludes with the thesis of the End of Philosophy, which is yet to be proven by following the behavior of the concept of Sein in the relevant projects: that is, after investigating Hedegger's project of „Destruction,“ necessary research is subjected to Heidegger's project of „Overcoming.“ This will be explored through Heidegger's main works of the second thinking period: initially, the presentation will be focused on Heidegger's work titled „Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry“ („Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung“) and then the two-volume work titled „Nietzsche I/II.“ Finally, this will be conducted through Heidegger's exposition of ontology in Hölderlin's poetry, Heidegger's presentation of Nietzsche's teachings as teachings of completing metaphysics, and ultimately Heidegger's recollection of metaphysics itself. The concept of „End“ („Das Ende“) as a noun is the concept that historians of philosophy, interpreters, and thinkers use to designate the third period of thinking in Heidegger's work. Although in several places in the second thinking period, Heidegger criticizes authors who write about the end, crisis, or downfall, in the third thinking period, Heidegger postulates such a thesis about the End of Philosophy. Such a statement is explicitly presented in Heidegger's lecture titled „The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking“ („Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens“) from 1964. Thus, the last years of his writing produced the thesis of the „End“ as the End of Philosophy, which often takes the place of a kind of seal on Heidegger's entire oeuvre in interpretative literature. And because the „End“ represents Heidegger's thesis addressing the relation to Sein, in this part of the work, it will be explored how the concept of Sein behaves in Heidegger's thesis of the „End,“ what place Sein has in the End of Philosophy, and what results were particularly achieved in the conclusions of Heidegger's final research. It is significant to note here that „End,“ like „Destructing,“ is a noun, unlike „Overcoming,“ which is a verbal noun or an unfinished continuous verb, suggesting that the „End“ is certain and concluded. Also noteworthy is that „End“ is Heidegger's last thinking period, so it cannot actually be criticized as the „Destruction“ could be criticized for its incompleteness – thereby creating the verbal noun „Destructing.“ However, even though it is the third and final period of Heidegger's thinking, one should not succumb to the suggestion that it is a finished and concluded teaching; it remains to be seen in future research whether the thesis of the „End“ is ultimately completed. This tendency suggests that Heidegger's projects of „Destruction“ and „Overcoming“ have an unfinished character that concludes with the thesis of the End of Philosophy, which is yet to be proven by following the behavior of the concept of Sein in the relevant projects: that is, after investigating Hedegger's project of „Destruction“ and the project of „Overcoming,“ finally subjected to research is Heidegger's thesis of the „End.“ This will be explored through Heidegger's main works of the third thinking period: initially, the presentation will focus on Heidegger's work from 1951/52 titled „What Is Called Thinking?“ („Was heißt Denken?“), then the work from 1955/1956 titled „On the Principle of Reason“ („Der Satz vom Grund“), and the work from 1962/1964 titled „On the Matter of Thinking“ („Zur Sache des Denkens“). Finally, this will be conducted through the presentation of the problem of Sein as the problem of thinking, the problem of the modern principle of thinking, and the End of Philosophy and the task of thinking. Second part of dissertation: The main work of Martin Heidegger is titled „Being and Time“ („Sein und Zeit“), which, from the complex conceptual apparatus of Heidegger's work, separates and emphasizes two concepts, namely Sein and Zeit. In subsequent clarifications of his main work, Heidegger supports the thesis of historians of philosophy, interpreters, and thinkers that Sein is the main concept of his work. However, the main work presupposes that it is actually Zeit that allows Sein to have any significance. Zeit gives Sein to the Seiende that questions Sein and is terminologically captured as Dasein. In line with this, it is argued that Dasein always reckons with Zeit, and if, as such, it poses the question of Sein, it puts the concept of Zeit in an inseparable connection with Dasein on the one hand, and with Sein on the other. In the first thinking period, Sein is always the Sein of some entity – Zeit gives Sein any significance – Dasein always reckons with Zeit, thereby pointing to the future as the primary phenomenon of true temporality. However, during the third thinking period, Heidegger abandons this assumption and poses the question of Sein independently of Dasein as the Seiende that poses the question of Sein, reducing his teachings on Zeit to the presentification of the future. During the second thinking period – a transitional period between the third thinking period, in which the position regarding the question of Sein changes, and the first thinking period, in which the aforementioned assumption is presented and later abandoned – Heidegger significantly explicates the essential structure of Dasein, defined as being-in-the-world, and the reckoning with Zeit by discussing the spiritual origins of Greece, the birth certificate of the West recorded in Rome, the upcoming future of Europe, and the ultimate downfall of the World. This aspect will be thoroughly explained in this part of the work. Specifically, the analysis will be presented by discussing the future as the primary phenomenon of true temporality in the first period of Heidegger's thinking, then interpretatively developing the concept of the future in Heidegger's second thinking period, and finally, the arrival of the future in the present during Heidegger's third thinking period. In essence, the ultimate goal of this part of the work is to outline, in broad strokes, the genesis of Heidegger's teachings on Zeit in his selected works. In summary, this part of the work aims to prove the postulated thesis that Heidegger interpretively developed the concept of the future as the primary phenomenon of true temporality in the first thinking period, ultimately presenting the presentification of the future during the third thinking period – all while discussing what, for him, represents the European in which the world has sunk. The concepts of Dasein and Zeit, which must be considered according to the assumption that Zeit always gives Sein significance, are always in a relationship. Zeit is always Zeit for Dasein, just as Sein is always Sein for the Zeit that gives it any significance. Therefore, Heidegger, in his main work titled „Being and Time“ („Sein und Zeit“), takes the concept of Zeit as a central notion alongside the concept of Sein. The exploration of the concept of Zeit in relation to the question of Sein actually forms the core of Heidegger's main work, starting with the investigation of an ontic draft for later ontological research in which Zeit provides meaning to the results of previous inquiries. Particularly, the majority of Heidegger's remaining work during the first thinking period is devoted to the exploration of Zeit. Such dedication to the investigation of Zeit becomes more prominent later in 1929 in the work „Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics“ („Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik“), where, in a four-hour lecture as a draft for the second part of Heidegger's main work, efforts were made to conclusively elucidate the relevant problem. In this part of the work, Heidegger's teachings on Zeit in the first thinking period will be explored, presenting the ecstasies of Zeit as temporality, presentness, and futurity. Subsequently, his teachings on Zeit when temporality is determined by the meaning of Dasein's Sein to repeat the investigations regarding the obtained results of previously conducted existential analytics of Dasein will be discussed. Finally, Heidegger's teachings on what Zein is will be presented, attempting to expose Kant's main work titled „Critique of Pure Reason“ („Kritik der reinen Vernunft“) as the foundation of metaphysics. All of this will be discussed with regard to Dasein because Dasein is the entity that has to reckon with Zeit on the one hand and with being-in-the-world as the essential structure of Dasein on the other. Ultimately, this will be accomplished by initially presenting the ontic everydayness of Dasein, then addressing the problem of what everydayness is and the resulting ecstatic primacy of the future, and finally, discussing the temporality of Zeit from the future to outline Heidegger's teachings on the future as the primary phenomenon of true temporality during the first thinking period as a period of the Destructing of the history of inherited ontology guided by the thread of the question of Sein. Heidegger's main work is not titled "Dasein and the Future," but Heidegger starts from the premise that Sein is always the Sein of some Seiende, that Zeit is what gives Sein any significance, and that the future is the primary phenomenon of true temporality. In this context, Sein and Zeit are ontologically more original than Dasein and the future, even though the latter refers to them, depends on them, and aligns with them. Dasein, as the Seiende that questions Sein, is Dasein only because it poses the question of Sein, just as the future, while the primary phenomenon of true temporality, is still one of the ecstasies of temporality that is always mentioned as the first. After presenting Heidegger's teachings on Zeit during his first thinking period as the destructing of the history of inherited ontology guided by the thread of the question of Sein, and discussing the future as the primary phenomenon of true temporality and everything contained therein, including the question of Dasein and its essential structure of being-in-theworld that reckons with Zeit, this part of the work will present Heidegger's interpretative development of the concept of the future as one of the ecstasies of temporality in his second thinking period, which is characterized as the Overcoming of metaphysics. This will be done through the main works of the second thinking period: first, speeches and lectures on Hölderlin's poetry during the second thinking period, collected together with later ones in the work „Explanations on Hölderlin's Poetry“ („Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung“), and then lectures and discussions written in the form of lectures in two volumes titled „Nietzsche I/II.“ In these works, Heidegger, while interpretively developing the concept of the future, engages in a dialogue of thought with Hölderlin's singing and delves more deeply into Nietzsche's thinking, systematically explaining the essential structure of Dasein as being-in-the-world and its reckoning with Zeit. In numerous instances, he points to the ancestral spiritual source of Greece, the birth certificate that the West has written in Rome, what is coming as the future of Europe, and the ultimate demise of the world— and precisely, these aspects need to be more thoroughly explained in the forthcoming research. Finally, all the announced topics will be presented with an initial exposition of Hölderlin's poetic vision of what is to come, which Heidegger calls an attempt at interpretation or ultimately a dialogue of thought with a certain singing. Then, Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's thinking regarding Hölderlin's question of destiny will be discussed, followed by Nietzsche's exposition of the future in Heidegger's engagement with Nietzsche. This will outline Heidegger's interpretative development of the concept of the future during the second thinking period as a period of Overcoming metaphysics. After the interpretative development of the concept of the future during Heidegger's second period of thought, when he seeks to realize the project of Overcoming metaphysics, the third period of thought implies a certain abandonment of the initial assumptions in the first and second periods of thought. Heidegger explicitly articulates changes in position in the main works of the third period of thought, just as we can find statements supporting this in his stenograms, interviews, and notes, published posthumously. The third period of thought contains indications of assumptions that are reasonable, as the project transitions without offering research results that were announced at the very beginning. In this context, Heidegger puts forward the thesis of the End of Philosophy, bringing what was announced as the future into the present and revising his teachings on Zeit. During the third period of thought, Heidegger ceases to write about the three ecstasies of Zeit as pastness, presentness, and futurity, focusing instead on the four dimensions of Zeit, thereby giving a kind of preference to the present. In line with this, this part of the work will explore the main works of Heidegger's third period of thought: namely, lectures titled „What Is Called Thinking?“ („Was heißt Denken?“), then lectures titled „On the Principle of Reason“ („Der Satz vom Grund“), and finally, lectures on „On the Essence of Thinking“ („Zur Sache des Denkens“). The aim of this research is to ascertain Heidegger's change of position regarding the question of Sein in light of what was mentioned as the abandonment of initial assumptions presented during the first and second periods of thought, falling under the stated thesis of the End of Philosophy in the third period of thought, and the implications that arise from this on the question of Sein, on the subject as such, and its essential structure of being-in-the-world, as well as concluding discussions on Zeit. Indeed, throughout the third period of thought, the emphasized future is brought into the present, transforming what is European into what is global, which ultimately needs to be understood in the context of Heidegger's thesis on the End of Philosophy. Finally, all that has been announced is to be presented with an initial exposition of Heidegger's repeated interpretation of Nietzsche's teachings on the overman, in a way that the overman actually completes the future. Subsequently, an exposition of what Heidegger arrived at through his investigations of Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason, in a manner that the present is ultimately ordered according to Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason. Lastly, an exposition on Heidegger's End of Philosophy during the third period of thought, which is precisely designated as the „End.“