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Aristotle’s Rational Powers and the Explanation of Action
Zeitschrift fur philosophische forschung, 74 (2020), 1; 53-79. https://doi.org/10.3196/004433020828856935
Grgić, Filip

Institucijski repozitorij: Repozitorij Instituta za filozofiju

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Grgić, F. (2020). Aristotle’s Rational Powers and the Explanation of Action. Zeitschrift fur philosophische forschung, 74. (1), 53-79. doi: 10.3196/004433020828856935

Grgić, Filip. "Aristotle’s Rational Powers and the Explanation of Action." Zeitschrift fur philosophische forschung, vol. 74, br. 1, 2020, str. 53-79. https://doi.org/10.3196/004433020828856935

Grgić, Filip. "Aristotle’s Rational Powers and the Explanation of Action." Zeitschrift fur philosophische forschung 74, br. 1 (2020): 53-79. https://doi.org/10.3196/004433020828856935

Grgić, F. (2020) 'Aristotle’s Rational Powers and the Explanation of Action', Zeitschrift fur philosophische forschung, 74(1), str. 53-79. doi: 10.3196/004433020828856935

Grgić F. Aristotle’s Rational Powers and the Explanation of Action. Zeitschrift fur philosophische forschung [Internet]. 2020. [pristupljeno 29.11.2024.];74(1):53-79. doi: 10.3196/004433020828856935

F. Grgić, "Aristotle’s Rational Powers and the Explanation of Action", Zeitschrift fur philosophische forschung, vol. 74, br. 1, str. 53-79, 2020. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:475793. [Citirano: 29.11.2024.]

Za citiranje koristite ovu mrežnu adresu: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:475793
Podaci o radu
Naslov (engleski)Aristotle’s Rational Powers and the Explanation of Action
AutorFilip Grgić
Autorova ustanovaInstitut za filozofiju
Znanstveno / umjetničko
područje, polje i grana		HUMANISTIČKE ZNANOSTI
Filozofija
Sažetak (engleski)
In this paper, I discuss Aristotle’s notion of rational powers as presented in his Metaphysics Θ.2 and Θ.5. I argue, first, that his account cannot serve as the model for explaining human rational actions in general. The role of rational powers is restricted to the explanation of arts and their exercises, including the exercises of knowledge through teaching. The exercises of character virtues do not follow the same pattern that is discernible in the exercises of rational powers. Second, I try to show that the similarities between Aristotle’s rational powers and powers as they are commonly understood in contemporary accounts of agency, especially regarding their two-sidedness and up-to-usness, are only superficial. Aristotle’s rational powers are not genuinely two-sided, and their being up to the agent has nothing to do with the availability of alternative courses of action.
Ključne riječi (engleski)
Jezikengleski
Vrsta publikacijeZnanstveni rad - Izvorni znanstveni rad
Status objaveObjavljen
Vrsta recenzijeRecenziran - međunarodna recenzija
Verzija publikacijeZavršna verzija rukopisa prihvaćena za objavljivanje (postprint)
Naslov časopisaZeitschrift fur philosophische forschung
Brojčani podacivol. 74, br. 1, str. 53-79
p-ISSN0044-3301
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.3196/004433020828856935
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:261:475793
Datum objave publikacije2020
URL dokumentahttp://bib.irb.hr/999569
Vrsta resursaTekst
Prava pristupaInstitucijski pristup
Uvjeti korištenjaIkona licence Zaštićeno autorskim pravom.
Datum i vrijeme pohrane2023-03-21 20:52:53