prikaz prve stranice dokumenta The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning
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The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning
Croatian Journal of Philosophy, IX (2009), 25; 91-100. urn:nbn:hr:261:541187
Sušnik, Matej

Institucijski repozitorij: Repozitorij Instituta za filozofiju

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Sušnik, M. (2009). The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, IX. (25), 91-100. Preuzeto s https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:541187

Sušnik, Matej. "The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning." Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol. IX, br. 25, 2009, str. 91-100. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:541187

Sušnik, Matej. "The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning." Croatian Journal of Philosophy IX, br. 25 (2009): 91-100. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:541187

Sušnik, M. (2009) 'The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning', Croatian Journal of Philosophy, IX(25), str. 91-100. Preuzeto s: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:541187 (Datum pristupa: 14.07.2024.)

Sušnik M. The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning. Croatian Journal of Philosophy [Internet]. 2009. [pristupljeno 14.07.2024.];IX(25):91-100. Dostupno na: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:541187

M. Sušnik, "The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning", Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol. IX, br. 25, str. 91-100, 2009. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:541187. [Citirano: 14.07.2024.]

Za citiranje koristite ovu mrežnu adresu: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:541187
Podaci o radu
Naslov (engleski)The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning
AutorMatej Sušnik
Autorova ustanovaInstitut za filozofiju
Znanstveno / umjetničko
područje, polje i grana		HUMANISTIČKE ZNANOSTI
Filozofija
Sažetak (engleski)
In his book Moralna spoznaja Baccarini argues that, with respect to the individual reasoning about morality, the method of reflective equilibrium is the appropriate method of moral reasoning. The starting point of my argument is Baccarini’ s refutation of Hare’ s view. As I see it, one of Baccarini’ s central arguments against Hare consists in claiming that Hare’ s approach to the amoralist objection weakens the deductive model of moral reasoning. I argue that the amoralist objection also poses a threat to the method of reflective equilibrium. At the end of the paper, I consider another view of moral reasoning which, in my view, is better suited to deal with the amoralist objection.
Ključne riječi (engleski)
Jezikengleski
Vrsta publikacijeZnanstveni rad - Izvorni znanstveni rad
Status objaveObjavljen
Vrsta recenzijeRecenziran - međunarodna recenzija
Verzija publikacijeObjavljena verzija rada (izdavačev PDF)
Naslov časopisaCroatian Journal of Philosophy
Brojčani podacivol. IX, br. 25, str. 91-100
p-ISSN1333-1108
e-ISSN1847-6139
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:261:541187
Datum objave publikacije2009
Vrsta resursaTekst
Prava pristupaOtvoreni pristup
Uvjeti korištenjaIkona licence Zaštićeno autorskim pravom.
Datum i vrijeme pohrane2021-04-22 10:20:36