prikaz prve stranice dokumenta Intentions, collateral damage and indifference to human life
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Intentions, collateral damage and indifference to human life
Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XXII (2020), 3; 817-832. https://doi.org/10.13137/1825-5167/31714
Sušnik, Matej

Institucijski repozitorij: Repozitorij Instituta za filozofiju

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Sušnik, M. (2020). Intentions, collateral damage and indifference to human life. Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XXII. (3), 817-832. doi: 10.13137/1825-5167/31714

Sušnik, Matej. "Intentions, collateral damage and indifference to human life." Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, vol. XXII, br. 3, 2020, str. 817-832. https://doi.org/10.13137/1825-5167/31714

Sušnik, Matej. "Intentions, collateral damage and indifference to human life." Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics XXII, br. 3 (2020): 817-832. https://doi.org/10.13137/1825-5167/31714

Sušnik, M. (2020) 'Intentions, collateral damage and indifference to human life', Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XXII(3), str. 817-832. doi: 10.13137/1825-5167/31714

Sušnik M. Intentions, collateral damage and indifference to human life. Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics [Internet]. 2020. [pristupljeno 29.11.2024.];XXII(3):817-832. doi: 10.13137/1825-5167/31714

M. Sušnik, "Intentions, collateral damage and indifference to human life", Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, vol. XXII, br. 3, str. 817-832, 2020. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:571611. [Citirano: 29.11.2024.]

Za citiranje koristite ovu mrežnu adresu: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:261:571611
Podaci o radu
Naslov (engleski)Intentions, collateral damage and indifference to human life
AutorMatej Sušnik
Autorova ustanovaInstitut za filozofiju
Znanstveno / umjetničko
područje, polje i grana		HUMANISTIČKE ZNANOSTI
Filozofija
Sažetak (engleski)
In this paper, I discuss a possible moral difference between terrorism and war. The standard approach to this question relies on the doctrine of double effect (DDE). The DDE advocates believe that it matters morally whether certain harm is intentionally caused or whether it merely occurs as a foreseen but unintended side effect. I suggest that the DDE does not answer the question and that the moral difference between terrorism and war cannot be adequately captured as long as one focuses on moral justification or permissibility. The critical difference, it is claimed, is not that war is sometimes morally right or permissible, but that terrorism and war do not display the same attitude toward innocent people. The distinction between permissibility and blameworthiness also enables us to see why some wars, such as those covered by the name “war on terror”, should be morally distinguished from terrorism.
Ključne riječi (engleski)
Jezikengleski
Vrsta publikacijeZnanstveni rad - Izvorni znanstveni rad
Status objaveObjavljen
Vrsta recenzijeRecenziran - međunarodna recenzija
Verzija publikacijeObjavljena verzija rada (izdavačev PDF)
Naslov časopisaEtica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
Brojčani podacivol. XXII, br. 3, str. 817-832
p-ISSN1825-5167
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.13137/1825-5167/31714
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:261:571611
Datum objave publikacije2020
ProjektŠifra: UIP-2017-05-4308
Naziv (hrvatski): Šteta, namjere i odgovornost
Kratica: HIRe
Voditelj: Matej Sušnik
Pravna nadležnost: Hrvatska
Financijer: HRZZ
Linija financiranja: UIP
Vrsta resursaTekst
Prava pristupaOtvoreni pristup
Uvjeti korištenjaIkona licence Zaštićeno autorskim pravom.
Datum i vrijeme pohrane2022-01-24 11:49:06