After the last financial crisis in 2008, the EU embarked on regulating the banking sector with the aim of safeguarding confidence in the financial system and preventing the harmful consequences of moral hazard. The new bank resolution framework introduced the instrument of internal bank resolution, known as "bail-in," where the costs of resolution are primarily borne by the shareholders and creditors of the bank undergoing resolution. This represents a contrast to the previous practice of bailout, which involved rescuing a struggling bank with taxpayers' money. As a protective measure, the principle “No creditor worse off” was established - shareholders and creditors undergoing resolution should not incur greater losses than they would in a regular insolvency proceeding. This paper focuses on the protection of bank shareholders and creditors in the context of resolution, where ownership instruments are taken away through resolution measures. The paper provides an overview of the practices of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union when deciding on the legality of such measures in cases of the resolution of European banks in recent history. Special attention is also given to the ways of seeking judicial protection, particularly through an action for annulment under Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), with a specific emphasis on meeting procedural criteria when filing the action for annulment.